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Putin’s neo-tsarist, authoritarian system.
In addition, the Ministry of Defense,
rather than embracing a professional
army, insists upon expanding conscription and enserfing thousands of men as
their ancestors were enserfed over a
century ago. Thus, until and unless defense reforms are carried out beyond
mere reorganizations of the force structure, Russia cannot have effective
armed forces, security, or democracy.
Until then it will remain tempted by
imperialism and military adventurism,
as in Chechnya, and fail to retrieve its
European vocation or achieve true integration into Europe. Under the circumstances, then, it would be a good idea if
the authors could be prevailed upon to
write a second edition that incorporates
the most recent trends. Then we could
derive maximum benefit from this splendid book that was published too soon.
STEPHEN BLANK

Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Penna.

Mallmann Showell, Jak P. German Naval Codebreakers. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
2003. 160pp. $29.95

In the almost thirty years since the public revelation that the Allies in World
War II broke substantial portions of the
German ENIGMA cipher system, Allied
codebreaking has become a staple of
our understanding of the Battle of the
Atlantic. Less understood are the parallel efforts of the German navy to break
Allied naval codes. The historical record of German codebreaking is comparatively fragmentary, many records
having been destroyed during or immediately after the war. German naval
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intelligence was smaller than its Allied
counterparts and left a smaller trace.
Still, the influence of these German efforts on the pivotal convoy battles of
the war has remained an important unanswered question. In German Naval
Codebreakers, Jak Showell, author of
more than a dozen books on German
U-boats, has attempted to provide an
account of signals intelligence in the
German navy in World War II.
The German Naval Radio Monitoring
Service (or Funkbeobachtungsdienst,
commonly abbreviated B-Dienst)
worked with some success against British and American naval codes. During
the early period of the war until 1943,
the B-Dienst could read large parts of
the Allied merchant ship and convoy
codes, which provided important insights into convoy operations and routing. In addition to codebreaking,
B-Dienst operated a network of direction finders that fixed the approximate
locations of radio transmissions in the
Atlantic.
Whatever its success at codebreaking,
the German navy in World War II
failed at the critical second step of intelligence analysis. Showell creates the impression that B-Dienst personnel were
separated from key operational commanders and were not permitted access
to information about their own forces’
operations. The B-Dienst was therefore
reduced to passing raw messages to senior commands, feeding the complaint
that radio intelligence served only to
provide a flood of useless information.
This arrangement stands in marked
contrast to the intimate relationship between commanders and operational intelligence centers in Britain and the
United States.
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From the outset, the book suffers from
an unfortunate organization. Attempting to avoid a chronological history of the war at sea, the author has
arranged his material in a series of short
vignettes, separated by ship type and
area of operations. Lost in this organization is the common thread of the
B-Dienst itself. Showell, for example,
touches on the question of how intelligence support was provided to German
units at sea in several sections but never
ties them together to address the critical
question of information dissemination
across the German navy. Showell attempts to circumvent this problem by a
series of appendixes on organization,
but these are too brief to serve the need,
and the result is confusing and unclear.
Within these sections there are historical gems. For example, the author discusses a February 1943 incident in
which the B-Dienst intercepted a British message containing German submarine locations—potential evidence that
the German code was itself being read
by the Allies. Ultimately, the German
navy convinced itself that its operational information had been compromised through other means and that its
codes were secure. However, this gem,
like all others mentioned, suffers from
the second major failing of the book—
an almost complete lack of documentation. While the work contains a list of
recommended reading and mentions at
the outset that it is largely based on
work found in private archives in Germany, there is no further reference to
the evidence.
The third and perhaps most important
failing of the book is a failure to explore
the full implications of German successes and failures. The fundamental
historical question is how the German
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navy set out to provide intelligence information to its commanders, and how
and why it succeeded or failed in that
effort. That question is never answered,
leaving the book at best titillating but
unsatisfying.
DALE C. RIELAGE

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Assistant Naval Attaché, Berlin

McCullough, David. 1776. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2005. 386pp. $32

David McCullough has written yet another enormously enjoyable and informative narrative history. Compared to
his monumental Pulitzer Prize–winning
biographies of Harry Truman and John
Adams, 1776 is only a snapshot of a
crucial moment in time, although it is
every bit as engaging. It covers the
events of the seventeen months between
King George III’s October 1775 announcement to Parliament of unrelenting war against his American colonies
and the arrival in Britain of the news of
George Washington’s victory at Trenton in March 1777. A story of overcoming adversity, 1776 focuses on the early
battles of the War of Independence,
which were mainly retreats for the ragged and often exhausted Continental
Army.
Based on McCullough’s expert research
in American and British archives, the
story is packed with rich descriptions
drawn from both sources. At age fortyfour, Washington is at the moral center of the drama. Although he had
never before led an army in battle and
is (as McCullough bluntly declares)
“indecisive and inept” in the early New
York campaigns, Washington learns
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